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Abstract
This paper discusses two notational variance views with respect to indexical singular 
reference and content: the view that certain forms of Millianism are at bottom notational 
variants of a Fregean theory of reference, the Fregean Notational Variance Claim; and 
the view that certain forms of Fregeanism are at bottom notational variants of a direct 
reference theory, the Millian Notational Variance Claim. While the former claim rests on 
the supposition that a direct reference theory could be easily turned into a particular 
version of a neo-Fregean one by showing that it is bound to acknowledge certain sense-
like entities, the latter claim is based upon the supposition that a neo-Fregean theory 
could be easily turned into a particular version of a Millian one by showing that De Re 
senses are theoretically superfluous and hence eliminable. The question how many ac-
counts of singular reference and content are we confronted with here — two different 
(and mutually antagonistic) theories? Or just two versions of what is in essence the same 
theory? — is surely of importance to anyone interested in the topic. And this question 
should be answered by means of a cûareful assessment of the soundness of each of the 
above claims. Before trying to adjudicate between the two accounts, one would natu-
rally want to know whether or not there are indeed two substantially disparate accounts. 
Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 26, n. 39, p. 465-486, jul./dez. 2014
DOI: 10.7213/aurora.26.039.DS01      ISSN 0104-4443
Licenciado sob uma Licença Creative Commons 
Grosso modo, if the Fregean Claim were sound then we would have a single general con-
ception of singular reference to deal with, viz. Fregeanism; likewise, if the Millian Claim 
were sound we would be facing a single general conception of singular reference, viz. 
Millianism. My view is that both the Fregean Notational Variance Claim and its Millian 
counterpart are wrong, though naturally on different grounds. I have argued elsewhere 
that the Fregean Notational Variance Claim — considered in its application to the se-
mantics of propositional-attitude reports involving proper names — is unsound. I intend 
to supplement in this paper such a result by trying to show that the Millian Claim — 
taken in its application to the semantics of indexical expressions — should also be rated 
as incorrect. I focus on a certain set of arguments for the Millian Claim, arguments which 
I take as adequately representing the general outlook of the Millian theorist with respect 
to neo-Fregeanism about indexicals and which involve issues about the cognitive sig-
nificance of sentences containing indexical terms. 
Keywords: Sense. Indexicals. Direct reference. Propositional attitudes. Cognitive value.
Resumo
Neste ensaio discutem-se dois pontos de vista sobre a variação notacional com respei-
to à referência e ao conteúdo singular indexical: o ponto de vista de que certas formas de 
Millianismo são no fundo variantes notacionais de uma teoria fregeana da referência, sendo 
esta a concepção fregeana da variação notacional; e o ponto de vista de que certas formas 
de Fregeanismo são no fundo variantes notacionais de uma teoria da referência directa, 
sendo esta a concepção milliana da variação notacional. Enquanto a primeira concepção 
assenta na suposição de que uma teoria da referência directa poderia ser facilmente conver-
tida numa versão particular de uma teoria neo-fregeana, mostrando que ela está obrigada 
a reconhecer certas entidades próximas de sentidos fregeanos, a segunda concepção está 
baseada na suposição de que uma teoria neo-fregeana poderia ser facilmente convertida 
numa versão particular de uma teoria milliana, mostrando que sentidos De Re são teorica-
mente supérfluos e logo elimináveis. A questão de saber com quantas teorias da referência e 
do conteúdo singular estamos aqui confrontados — duas teorias diferentes (e mutuamente 
antagónicas)? Ou apenas duas versões daquilo que é em essência a mesma teoria? — é uma 
questão seguramente importante para quem se interesse pelo tópico. E essa questão deve ser 
respondida através de um exame cuidadoso da plausibilidade de cada uma das concepções 
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acima mencionadas. Antes de tentarmos escolher entre as teorias em questão, quereríamos 
naturalmente saber se há ou não de facto duas teorias substancialmente díspares. Grosso 
modo, se a concepção fregeana da variação notacional fosse correcta, então teríamos de 
lidar com apenas uma teoria geral da referência singular, viz. o fregeanismo; analogamen-
te, se a concepção milliana da variação notacional fosse correcta, estaríamos confrontados 
com uma única teoria geral da referência singular, viz. o millianismo. Pensamos que, quer a 
concepção fregeana da variação notacional, quer a sua contraparte milliana, são incorrec-
tas, embora por razões diferentes (naturalmente). Argumentamos noutro lado que a con-
cepção fregeana da variação notacional — considerada na sua aplicação à semântica de 
relatos de atitudes proposicionais que contêm nomes próprios — é incorrecta. Tencionamos 
neste ensaio suplementar esse resultado com uma tentativa de mostrar que a concepção 
milliana da variação notacional — tomada na sua aplicação à semântica de expressões in-
dexicais — deve ser também vista como incorrecta. Concentramos a nossa atenção num 
conjunto de argumentos a favor da concepção milliana, argumentos esses que tomamos 
como adequadamente representativos do ponto de vista geral do teórico milliano sobre o 
neo-fregeanismo acerca de indexicais e que envolvem questões relativas ao significado cog-
nitivo de frases que contêm termos indexicais. 
Palavras-chave: Sentido. Indexicais. Referência directa. Atitudes proposicionais. Valor cognitivo.
Our starting point and motivation is nicely illustrated by consid-
ering the following claim made by John Hawthorne and David Manley 
in their recent book The Reference Book:
At any rate, surely anyone who claims that “Now is now” expresses 
the same proposition as “Now is Tuesday” must acknowledge at least 
the need for the explanation of the vast difference in cognitive payoff 
between the two ways of accessing that proposition (HAWTHORNE; 
MANLEY, 2012, p. 68).
On the neo-Fregean side, the charge has often been made against 
Millian theories of singular reference and singular content that they 
necessarily end up with the admission of theoretical entities which 
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are apparently indistinguishable from Fregean senses1. Such a counte-
nance of sense-like entities is normally taken by the neo-Fregean theo-
rist as an almost inevitable result of any attempts on the part of the 
Millian theorist to deal with certain aspects of the problem of singu-
lar content. The aspects in question consist mainly in issues about the 
cognitive significance of our use of sentences containing syntactically 
simple and unquoted singular terms. In trying to accommodate such 
problems within a directly referential approach, the Millian theorist is 
apparently led to introduce a conceptual apparatus which, according 
to his Fregean opponent, would not significantly differ from a frame-
work of modes of presentation.
The general upshot of the Fregean criticism is that one could 
hardly expect to be offered a satisfactory account of singular content 
which would qualify as being purely Millian, i.e. an account on which 
the propositional value of a singular term (as used in a certain context) 
is exhausted by its referent (relative to the context). Putative genuinely 
Millian theories, it is claimed, do not provide us with a real alterna-
tive to Fregeanism since a careful analysis will reveal them to be mere 
terminological variants of an essentially Fregean account. Indeed, the 
sense-like entities that such theories are allegedly forced to posit — 
e.g. Nathan Salmon’s singular guises (SALMON, 1986) or John Perry’s 
ways of apprehending individuals (PERRY, 1979) — would in some 
way or other play an intermediate semantic role between the singu-
lar terms, on the one hand, and their referents, on the other; and this 
would presumably preclude the theories in question from being purely 
Millian (in the above sense).
More surprising is the fact that the converse claim has also been 
advanced, though perhaps not so often, on the Millian side. In effect, 
the view has been put forward2 that certain versions of a Fregean ac-
1 For example, Evans argues that John Perry’s account of indexical belief might be seen as a notational variant of a Fregean account, 
Perry’s ways of apprehending objects being equated with Fregean indexical senses; see G. Evans (1981, p. 317-318). Graeme Forbes 
(1989b, p. 474-475) makes a similar claim in his article.
2  E.g. by Scott Soames (1989, p. 153-156).
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count of singular reference, especially those versions whose distinctive 
feature is a De Re construal of singular Sinne, on which singular modes 
of presentation are object dependent, might in the end be counted as 
being mere terminological variants of a direct reference theory.
A typical pattern of reasoning used by the Millian theorist to 
reach such a conclusion might be synoptically described as follows. 
Once subjected to a close scrutiny, putative De Re senses attached by 
speakers to singular terms in the language, besides being obscure or ill-
defined, turn out to be spurious or redundant. And the general reason 
usually adduced to establish this redundancy is that every substantive 
semantic role which could be reasonably assigned to the postulated 
singular senses could apparently be entirely carried out by, or naturally 
passed on to, either the referents of the singular terms or other theoreti-
cal entities available in the conceptual machinery of a direct reference 
theory (e.g. David Kaplan’s characters or Perry’s belief states). Hence, 
by applying Ockham’s razor, it seems that one would be in a position 
to eliminate De Re Sinne from the ontology of a neo-Fregean theory of 
reference, in which case such a (reconstructed) theory would indeed 
dissolve into a Millian theory. Therefore, if the arguments given for 
the eliminability of De Re singular senses on the basis of their alleged 
semantic vacuity were sound, then neo-Fregean accounts resting upon 
them would not constitute a serious alternative to Millianism.
I shall label as follows the two conflicting general views, both 
grounded on “notational variance” considerations, sketched above. I 
shall call the view that certain forms of Millianism are (in the sense 
mentioned) notational variants of a Fregean theory of reference, the 
Fregean Notational Variance Claim; and I shall call the view that certain 
forms of Fregeanism are (in the sense mentioned) notational variants 
of a direct reference theory, the Millian Notational Variance Claim. To 
sum up, while the former claim rests on the supposition that a direct 
reference theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a 
neo-Fregean one by showing that it is bound to acknowledge certain 
sense-like entities, the latter claim is based upon the supposition that a 
neo-Fregean theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a 
Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 26, n. 39, p. 465-486, jul./dez. 2014
Indexical Sinn 469
Millian one by showing that De Re senses are theoretically superfluous 
and hence eliminable.
Now the question how many accounts of singular reference 
and content are we confronted with here — two different (and mutu-
ally antagonistic) theories? Or just two versions of what is in essence 
the same theory? — is surely of importance to anyone interested in 
the topic. And this question should be answered by means of a care-
ful assessment of the soundness of each of the above claims. Before 
trying to adjudicate between the two accounts, one would naturally 
want to know whether or not there are indeed two substantially dispa-
rate accounts. Grosso modo, if the Fregean Claim were sound then we 
would have a single general conception of singular reference to deal 
with, viz. Fregeanism; likewise, if the Millian Claim were sound we 
would be facing a single general conception of singular reference, viz. 
Millianism. And, while not intending to neglect other reference theo-
ries — even those theories about the impossibility, in principle, of set-
ting up a systematical account of singular reference (perhaps following 
a Wittgensteinian model or the model of Schiffer’s “No-Theory Theory 
of Meaning”3) — it appears that the contemporary dispute in the field 
turns mainly around the two sorts of approach under consideration.
My view is that both the Fregean Notational Variance Claim 
and its Millian counterpart are wrong, though naturally on different 
grounds. I think that they are clearly wrong if one takes them literally; 
notice that, in this case, they are very strong claims indeed since they 
involve very strong assumptions concerning the two theories, e.g. their 
full inter-translatability and the strict identity of their logical conse-
quences. Moreover, I am inclined to think that they are also wrong if 
one weakens them in a certain way and construes them as claims which 
are only approximately true (in a sense to be introduced when particu-
lar proposals are considered). 
On the other hand, such negative results about the two notation-
al variance claims have to be independently established. For, at least 
given the way in which they have been represented, it is clear that the 
3  SCHIFFER, 1989.
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unsoundness of either of them would not entail either the unsound-
ness of the other (this one might still hold) or its soundness (they might 
both be false). Indeed, what we seem to have here are two claims each 
having the following conjunctive form. The Fregean claim is to the ef-
fect that the Millian theory — subjected to certain modifications which 
would not affect it in a substantial way — is a notational variant of a 
neo-Fregean account, and that the equivalent theories should eventu-
ally be regarded as two-level theories of semantic (singular) content. 
And the Millian claim is to the effect that the neo-Fregean theory — 
subjected to certain modifications which would not affect it in a sub-
stantial way — is a notational variant of a directly referential account, 
and that the equivalent theories should eventually be regarded as one-
level theories of semantic (singular) content. 
I have argued elsewhere4 that the Fregean Notational Variance 
Claim — considered in its application to the semantics of proposition-
al-attitude reports involving proper names — is unsound. I intend now 
to supplement such a result by trying to show that the Millian Claim 
— taken in its application to the semantics of indexical expressions — 
should also be rated as incorrect. I focus on a certain set of arguments 
for the Millian Claim, arguments which I take as adequately represent-
ing the general outlook of the Millian theorist with respect to neo-Fre-
geanism about indexicals.
One might summarize as follows the main line of criticism de-
veloped by the Millian theorist. It is argued that neo-Fregean theories 
about De Re senses for indexical expressions are bound to face the fol-
lowing dilemma. Either they can be reconstructed as notational vari-
ants of direct reference theories, De Re indexical senses having no clear 
explanatory function and being thus wholly dispensable in favour of a 
Millian semantics for indexicals; or they yield results which are unac-
ceptable in the light of our intuitions about the use of indexicals in the 
ascription of attitudes. In what follows, my concern is basically with 
the first horn of the above putative dilemma.
4  BRANQUINHO, 1990.
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For convenience, I take the target of the Millian notational vari-
ance arguments to be some such a neo-Fregean account of indexical-
ity as the one expounded by Evans (1981); although the arguments in 
question are such that they apply to virtually any Fregean theory using 
the notion of a De Re indexical mode of presentation, e.g. Peacocke’s 
(1981) account.
It is a curious thing to notice that Evans draws on translation 
considerations to attack John Perry’s directly referential account of 
indexicals, which he charges with being a terminological variant of a 
Fregean theory. Furthermore, the sort of argumentative strategy em-
ployed is prima facie very much similar to the one used by the Millian 
theorist; indeed, the general pattern of reasoning seems to consist in 
trying, in both cases, to establish the following kind of disjunction 
(taken as constituting an inescapable dilemma for the rival account): 
either the opposite view is shown to conflict with some aspects of our 
ordinary practice of attitude-ascription (e.g. Perry’s “P-Thoughts” — 
i.e. sequences of objects and senses of predicative expressions — are 
taken by Evans as utterly inadequate to serve as the objects of propo-
sitional attitudes), or it is shown to be a mere notational variant of the 
favoured approach.
As noticed, the direct reference theorist is likely to argue from 
the dispensability of indexical senses to the Millian Notational Variance 
Claim. And there is no immediate reason to think that such a move 
might not be a valid one, provided that it is at the same time shown 
that the conceptual machinery of a direct reference theory for indexicals 
is able to do everything which the allegedly superfluous senses were 
supposed to do. Let me then outline the central arguments which could 
be mounted in order to support the premise of the above move. The 
Millian strategy might be characterized as follows. First, we are given 
some enumeration of certain fundamental semantic roles which are 
standardly assigned to singular senses, such roles being normally re-
garded by the Fregean theorist as providing us with conclusive reasons 
for the introduction of Sinne. Then it is claimed that either De Re indexi-
cal senses are not really needed to carry out any of the listed semantic 
functions — these could be arguably transferred to theoretical entities 
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already available within a Millian framework — or they turn out to be 
simply inadequate to fulfil the semantic roles in question (or both).
I select the following two semantic properties of senses, both re-
lated to cognitive significance, as those which are more relevant for our 
general purpose; I refer to them as roles (a) and (b) of indexical senses.
Role (a) of indexical senses is that they are meant to account for 
potential differences in informativeness, relative to a fully competent 
speaker, between utterances of sentences constructed out of co-refer-
ential indexicals (with respect to given contexts of use). Let S(i) and 
S(i’) be sentences which contain occurrences of indexicals i and i’ and 
which are used in contexts c and c’ (where one might have c = c’, as well 
as i = i’). And let the referent of i in c be the same as the referent of i’ in 
c’. Then there surely exist conceivable circumstances under which S(i) 
and S(i’) might differ in informative value for a speaker (not necessar-
ily the utterer) who understands both sentences. A familiar example 
is given in the pair of sentences “He is being attacked” and “I am be-
ing attacked” taken in a context in which I utter the former intending 
to refer to someone else, while what actually happens is that I do not 
recognize myself as the person whom I see — in a mirror I take to be a 
glass — being attacked. My knowledge would clearly be extended by 
my acquiring the information contained in the latter sentence, relative 
to the sort of knowledge I obtain from the former sentence in the same 
context. In general, the Fregean theorist would appeal to a difference 
in sense between i in c and i’ in c’ in order to explain possible differ-
ences in informativeness between sentences S(i) and S(i’) (where i and 
i’ are as indicated); concerning our example, there would be a differ-
ence between the types of ways of thinking of myself which I employ 
in thought — the third-person type versus the first-person type — and 
which I attach to the tokens of “he” and “I” in the envisaged situation. 
Role (b) of indexical senses is given in the property they possess 
of accounting for possible failures of substitutivity of co-referential 
indexicals in attitude-attributions, as well as blocking other apparent-
ly problematic results involving attitudes, particularly the possibility 
of a rational subject’s having contradictory indexical beliefs at a given 
time (or, without changing her mind, at different times). Indeed, a 
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difference in (customary) sense between indexicals i and i’ in contexts 
c and c’ (again, possibly c = c’ and i = i’) is usually postulated to block 
in general inferences from ascriptions of the form x V’s that S(i) to 
ascriptions of the form x V’s that S(i’); here V stands for a proposi-
tional-attitude verb, the (customary) referents of i and i’ in contexts 
c and c’ coincide, and the ascriptions are to be given their De Dicto 
readings. For instance, the invalidity of the move from “I believe that 
he is being attacked” to “I believe that I am being attacked” — taken 
with respect to the above sort of circumstances — would be explained 
in terms of a difference in the modes of presentation of myself re-
ferred to by the occurrences of the indexicals “he” and “I” within the 
“that”-clauses. And when, under such circumstances, I believe both 
that he (the man in question) is being attacked and that I am not being 
attacked, I cannot not be described as holding at the same time mu-
tually contradictory indexical beliefs about myself; for, according to 
Fregeanism, the contents of my beliefs are a certain Fregean thought 
and the negation of a distinct Fregean thought. 
Now the Millian theorist might argue to the effect that indexi-
cal senses are not needed to account for informative value. She might 
claim that there are notions available from a direct reference theory 
which are perfectly adequate for the purpose and which are more un-
problematic than the Fregean notion of indexical sense. One might 
summarize this line of reasoning by means of the following thesis:
Thesis 1: De Re indexical senses are not needed to explain poten-
tial differences in informativeness.
The Millian philosopher might take the informative value of an 
indexical i, i.e. the contribution of i to the informative value of sen-
tences in which it might occur, as being the character (or linguistic 
meaning) of i5. If one assumes that the conventional rules associated 
with indexicals as their characters are explicitly or implicitly known by 
fully competent speakers of the language, then a difference in character 
5  See D.Kaplan (1988a). It is worth noticing that meanwhile Kaplan has given up this view; in his paper (1988b), he suggests 
that differences in informative value might be explained in syntactical (and not semantical) terms, by means of certain 
syntactic properties assigned to the words employed (Cf. p. 598-599).
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between co-referential indexicals i and i’ in contexts c and c’ might be 
exploited to account for a possible difference in informative value (for a 
certain speaker) between utterances of sentences S(i) and S(i’) in c and 
c’. Thus, in our previous example, the difference in informativeness 
between “He is being attacked” and “I am being attacked” might be 
explained in terms of the different characters attached to the indexicals 
“he” and “I”; the character of the former could be given in the rule ac-
cording to which a token of “he” (used in a given context) refers to the 
demonstrated male, while the character of the latter will determine the 
referent of a token of “I” in a context (which happens to be the same 
person in the envisaged situation) as being the speaker or writer. And 
Frege’s puzzle about informative identities — as applied to indexicals 
— could be (apparently) accommodated by letting S(i) be i = i and S(i’) 
be i = i’, and by taking the different characters associated with i and i’ 
as explaining the potential informativeness of utterances of sentences 
of the latter form (e.g. “I am he”) as opposed to the uninformativeness 
(in general) of utterances of sentences of the former form (e.g. “I am I”).
On the other hand, concerning role (b), let me mention a sec-
ond line of reasoning the Millian theorist might pursue to reach the 
same general result about the semantic redundancy of indexical senses. 
I take such a line of reasoning as represented in the following thesis 
and its supporting argument6:
Thesis 2: De Re indexical senses are not needed to explain ap-
parent failures of substitutivity of co-referential indexicals in attitude-
ascriptions, or to block certain apparently problematic results about 
attitudes.
If sound, this claim would constitute a serious objection to any 
Fregean account of indexicality, since what is taken to be the privileged 
role of senses, and what is often proposed as the crucial rationale for 
their introduction, consists precisely in their status as theoretical enti-
ties postulated to explain why co-referential singular terms are not in 
6 See S.Soames (1989, p. 154-155). Although Soames’s arguments are mainly directed against Evans’s particular version of 
Fregeanism, they could be easily generalized to other neo-Fregean approaches.
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general interchangeable salva veritate when occurring in the embedded 
sentences of propositional-attitude constructions. 
The Millian argument for Thesis 2 runs as follows. Clearly, a ne-
cessary condition for inferences falling under the general pattern x V’s 
that S(i), i = i’ ∴ x V’s that S(i’) to be rated as invalid by the propo-
nent of a Fregean theory is that such a theory must provide us with a 
criterion for sameness of indexical sense; that is, it should state clearly 
under what conditions an indexical i used in a context c has the same 
sense as an indexical i’ used in a context c’. And, since sameness of 
reference is thought of as being necessary for sameness of sense, one 
should expect such a test to be given in particular for the case in whi-
ch the referent of i in c is identical to the referent of i’ in c’. Yet, the 
Fregean theory does not contain a uniform criterion for the sameness of 
indexical sense, i.e. a means of decision capable of being applied to the 
different categories of indexicals, such as personal pronouns like “I” 
and “he”, demonstratives like “this” and “that”, temporal indexicals 
like “now” and “today”, etc. Therefore, it is in general unclear how an 
appeal to senses might even account for failures of substitutivity (assu-
ming for the sake of argument the anti-Millian thesis that co-referential 
indexicals are not interchangeable salva veritate in attitude contexts).
The Millian critic would discern a certain tension in the neo-Fre-
gean account, a tension which reflects the alleged absence of a clear and 
uniform means of individuating indexical senses. On the one hand, the 
Fregean treatment of temporal indexicals, spatial indexicals, and per-
ceptual demonstratives allows utterances of sentences containing di-
fferent but co-referential indexicals of these kinds, as used in distinct 
contexts, to express the same (token) Fregean thought; hence, it allows 
the possibility of the same particular mode of presentation being asso-
ciated with different indexicals in different contexts of use. As a result, 
substitutivity and other problematic results about attitude-ascriptions 
would apparently be forthcoming in a neo-Fregean account of such ca-
tegories of indexicals. On the other hand, the Fregean treatment of per-
sonal pronouns precludes utterances of sentences containing distinct 
but co-referential indexicals (used in possibly different contexts) from 
expressing the same (token) Fregean thought; hence, it disallows the 
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possibility of the same particular sense being attached to different in-
dexicals of that sort (in possibly different contexts). As a result, substi-
tutivity and other problematic results about attitude-ascriptions would 
be blocked in a neo-Fregean account of such a category of indexicals. 
The consequences the Millian theorist urges us to draw from the 
adoption of such allegedly disparate verdicts on sameness of indexical 
sense are as follows. If indexical expressions are treated along the lines 
suggested above for temporal indexicals etc., then the resulting the-
ory will no longer be Fregean in nature; it will be simply a notational 
variant of a direct reference theory, redundant De Re indexical senses 
being eliminable and the referents of indexicals in given contexts doing 
all the relevant semantic work. If, on the other hand, indexicals are to 
be treated on the model of personal pronouns, then the resulting the-
ory, though presumably Fregean in nature, will be implausible since 
some of its consequences are incompatible with the way we intuitively 
use indexicals in attitude-ascriptions. The implication is, of course, that 
we should generalize in the former direction, i.e. from temporal inde-
xicals to other indexicals, in which case the Millian Notational Variance 
Claim would be warranted.
However, if one restricts the Millian claim supporting Thesis 2 to 
substitutivity results involving temporal indexicals, spatial indexicals, 
and perceptual demonstratives, then such a claim seems to be mispla-
ced; for the simple reason that, as far as I can see, one could hardly find 
any cases of genuine interchangeability salva veritate of indexicals of 
those sorts in attitude-attributions (assuming that these are given their 
De Dicto readings).
Take the case of temporal indexicals. Consider the sentence-type
  (1) Today is fine,
as uttered on a particular day, say d, and the sentence-type
  (2) Yesterday was fine,
as uttered on d+1, so that the referents of “today” on d and “yester-
day” on d+1 coincide. Evans and other neo-Fregean theorists, follow-
ing Frege, hold that under certain conditions the particular Fregean 
thought expressed by (1) on d may be the same as the one expressed by 
(2) on d+1; hence, the sense a speaker may attach to “today” on d, i.e. 
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the particular way of thinking of d she entertains on d, is allowed to be 
identical to the sense attached to “yesterday” on d+1, i.e. the particular 
way of thinking of d she entertains on d+1. Thus, here we have differ-
ent indexicals, same reference, different contexts of use (the times are 
distinct), and (possibly) the same sense.
 The Millian theorist would typically claim that this amounts to 
admitting that the referents of “today” and “yesterday” on d, d+1 fully 
determine the senses these indexicals may express on these occasions, 
in the sense that sameness of reference seems to be employed to indi-
viduate and equate the senses in question, determining the thoughts 
expressed as being one and the same on both occasions. It apparently 
follows that the putative De Re senses associated with the indexicals 
are entirely irrelevant for the semantic purpose of fixing the proposi-
tional contents of utterances of (1) and (2); the referents of “today” and 
“yesterday” on d, d+1 — taken as fixed by their associated characters 
— are clearly sufficient to the effect. 
 Furthermore, it is held that an appeal to indexical senses to blo-
ck substitutivity results would be useless here, since the neo-Fregean 
account would be in fact committed to such results. Yet, this appears 
to be wrong; for it turns out that the envisaged cases are not cases 
of substitutivity at all. Suppose that, on the 28th October 1989, Jones 
sincerely and reflectively assents to (an utterance) of (1). Thus, the 
belief-ascription
  (3) Jones believes that today is fine,
as uttered on that day, would naturally be counted as true. Yet, in the 
light of neo-Fregeanism, the belief-report
  (4) Jones believes that yesterday was fine,
as uttered on the 29th October 1989, might also — under certain condi-
tions7 — be counted as true (provided that meanwhile Jones has not 
changed his beliefs about the weather on the previous day); indeed, ex 
hypothesi, the embedded sentences in (3) and (4) may denote the same 
proposition: under certain circumstances, Jones could not believe the 
7  Such conditions for belief-retention are discussed in Branquinho (2008).
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Fregean thought referred to by the “that”-clause in (3) without belie-
ving the Fregean thought referred to by the “that”-clause in (4). 
 However, transitions such as the one from (3) to (4) — which 
are indeed licensed by the neo-Fregean account (as well as, on diffe-
rent grounds, by any Millian account) — are obviously not instances of 
substitutivity salva veritate of co-referential indexicals within the subor-
dinate clauses of attitude-ascriptions; because the times of Jones’s be-
lievings in (3) and (4) are clearly different. And it is very likely that one 
come across the same sort of situation in dealing with spatial indexicals 
and perceptual demonstratives (where the times at which the attitudes 
are held are relevant in a similar way). Therefore, one should deem 
wrong the Millian claim that, since in this area of indexicality there are 
no failures of substitutivity for senses to explain (substitutivity being 
in fact licensed by neo-Fregeanism), senses would not be needed to 
explain failures of substitutivity; in effect, it simply turns out that no 
substitutivity results of the intended kind are forthcoming in the area. 
 Let me finish the exposition of what I take to be the Millian 
argument for Thesis 2 by briefly contrasting the foregoing account of 
temporal indexicals, etc., with the standard Fregean view on personal 
pronouns. Consider the sentence-type
  (5) I am ugly,
as uttered by Jones at a time t, and the sentence-type
  (6) You are ugly,
as uttered at t’ (possibly t = t’) by someone, say Ralph, addressing Jones. 
Thus, given such contexts of use, the referent of “I” in (5) is the same as 
the referent of “you” in (6), viz. Jones. Now Evans and other Fregean 
theorists, again following Frege, hold that the thought expressed by 
Jones when he utters (5) is necessarily distinct from the thought expres-
sed by Ralph when he utters (6). Accordingly, the senses attached by 
Jones and Ralph to “I” and “you” must diverge, i.e. the particular way 
of thinking of himself Jones entertains in (5) is necessarily different 
from the particular way of thinking of him entertained by Ralph in (6). 
Hence, we have here the mentioned asymmetry between the treatment 
given to temporal indexicals, etc., and the treatment given to personal 
pronouns; with respect to the latter, in contrast with the former, it is 
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impossible for tokens of distinct personal pronouns used in contexts 
in which they are co-referential to express the same particular sense.
The Millian theorist would take the reason for such an asym-
metry to lie mainly in the Fregean doctrine that each person attaches 
a sense to “I” which is not entertainable or graspable by anyone else. 
Thus, only Jones is in a position to think of himself by employing the 
first-person way of thinking, and such thoughts are only accessible to 
him. Ralph can only think of Jones by employing the second-person 
(or the third-person) way of thinking, and he might do this by utte-
ring a sentence such as (6). According to Millianism, this conception 
of logically private modes of presentation is incompatible with our 
current practices in ascribing propositional-attitudes. For instance, it 
is said to imply that only I could be in a position to report e.g. the 
belief that I am ugly: it would be impossible for someone else to say 
about me “He believes that he is ugly”, for the ascriber would have 
to entertain my particular way of thinking about myself (which ex 
hypothesi cannot be the case). In addition to this, I could not be in a 
position to report propositional attitudes someone else, e.g. Ralph, 
takes about me; for example, it would be impossible for me to say 
“Ralph believes that I am ugly” for I would have to suppose that my 
particular way of thinking about myself is accessible to Ralph (which 
again cannot be the case). Again, the upshot is that, given the appa-
rent implausibility of such consequences, the Fregean should treat 
personal pronouns on the model proposed for temporal indexicals, 
etc.; but then the resulting semantic theory could allegedly be shown 
to be a notational variant of a directly referential account.
 Having in mind our general purpose, I will not tackle the first-
-person issue here. But let me just mention that the Millian criticism mi-
ght be countered by appealing to the distinction between using a sense 
in thought and mentioning a sense (Cf. PEACOCKE, 1981, p. 191-193). 
Roughly, the idea is that in order for a thinker to grasp or entertain a 
thought containing a certain mode of presentation it is surely necessary 
that she be able to refer to, or to think of, that mode of presentation; but 
it is not at all necessary that she be able to employ in thought the mode 
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of presentation in question, or to think the thought in question herself. 
Hence, it is certainly possible for someone else to grasp or entertain 
e.g. the thought that I am ugly; for when Jones thinks about me “He 
thinks that he is ugly”, he is not employing in thought my first-person 
way of thinking, or thinking the thought that I am ugly himself: he is 
referring to my first-person way of thinking. Likewise, it is certainly 
possible for me to report e.g. Ralph’s thought that I am ugly: from the 
fact that Ralph cannot think thoughts containing my first-person way 
of thinking it does not follow that such thoughts are unaccessible to 
him, or that he is prevented to refer to my first-person way of thinking.
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